QPC Briefing No. 42 2026 EA11 Agreement
Remuneration Outcomes
The appropriate comparison
One of the main reasons the April proposal was rejected because pilots considered that they were being asked to accept too many concessions for an inadequate financial outcome.
The AFAP agreed with that assessment and recommended a No vote.
Following the 66% No vote, the negotiating team returned to bargaining with a clear mandate to improve both sides of that equation: increase the value delivered to pilots and reduce the concessions required in return.
That is what the new in-principle agreement does.
When comparing end-state remuneration with the April proposal, every pilot receives a greater financial outcome under the current proposal, while the number and significance of concessions have been materially reduced. This briefing provides a direct comparison between the two proposals at their respective end states.
For completeness, we have also compared the current proposal against an adjusted April scenario that assumes a further 3% pay rise in July 2030. This additional increase did not form part of the April proposal but has been included to provide a favourable assumption for the April position when assessing longer-term outcomes.
As this round of bargaining has demonstrated, however, future pay increases should not be treated as certain. The timing and outcome of future negotiations, including whether increases are achieved promptly or with back pay, cannot be reliably predicted.
We have also provided comparisons against EA10 to ensure members compare to a hypothetical rollover of 3% per annum from the end of EA10. To be clear, that benchmark is 3% rate increases commencing from July 2024 (which was 12 months after the previous pay rise in 2023), and each year thereafter to July 2030. This appropriately compares the term of the proposed EA11 to a rollover.
Assessing the whole package
When assessing the proposed EA11 remuneration package, it is important to look beyond the headline hourly-rate increases and consider all the financial benefits on offer.
For pilots, the overall remuneration outcome is delivered through a combination of hourly-rate increases, structural changes to pay arrangements, AFDP settings and additional payments including Blank Line and standby passive credits.
The hourly rate is therefore an important part of the pay outcome, but it does not, by itself, represent the total increase in remuneration under EA11.
It is also important to account for the compounding effect of the annual increases. Each increase applies to the rate produced by the previous increase and, for some categories, follows an additional structural increase at commencement.
Pilots also need to assess what they will actually earn under the proposed EA compared with what they earn today, what they would have earned under the rejected April proposal and the realistic alternatives. Such comparisons need to be made on a like for like basis: the earnings must be assessed on the equivalent work.
That is the basis on which the remuneration outcomes in this briefing should be considered. We have outlined this in detail to allow members to form their own assessment with all the available information.
Depending on fleet and category, the total pay uplift (pay rise) is delivered through a combination of higher hourly rates, changes to credit-hour settings, Blank Line payments and, for the A350 and 787, qualifying ultra-long haul AFDPs (overtime).
This is why simply looking at the movement in the hourly-rate table, or adding together the annual percentage increases, does not show the full value of the agreement.
What changes does the agreement contain from both EA10 and the April offer?
Pay structure
The way the remuneration uplift is delivered differs by fleet.
A330 and A380
For the A330 and A380, the existing EA10 pay structure is retained.
The uplift is delivered primarily through increases to hourly rates, with a smaller component delivered through the new Blank Line payments.
The full hourly rate tables for the across the life of EA11 from the in-principle agreement are attached here for pilots reference.
Importantly, retention of the EA10 pay structure delivers further financial benefits by removing the “snap back” effect (reversion to level 1) for category changes from the April offer.
Retaining the existing structure for the A380 and A330 was an important objective for the AFAP following the April No vote. The 12-year scales are well understood, transparent and provide certainty around salary progression. Retaining them also avoids the complexity and potential unintended outcomes associated with the four-year structure proposed in April.
The negotiating team was also conscious that one or both of these fleets may retire either during the life of EA11 or relatively soon afterwards.
The objective was therefore to deliver fair remuneration improvements for pilots remaining on those fleets while ensuring pilots eventually moving to the longer-term B787 and A350 fleets do so onto strong underlying hourly rates.
A350 and B787
Under the proposed EA11, the A350 will be fully aligned with the B787 in relation to pay rates, divisors and relevant conditions, creating fleet pay. The full hourly rate tables during the life of EA11 are set out in the tables attached here.
This creates a simpler and more consistent remuneration structure across the two fleets that will form the future of the Qantas widebody operation.
AFDP Changes – A350/ B787
The A350 AFDPs contained in clause 34.1.9 of EA10 will be removed as the fleet aligns with the B787 and the existing AFDP mechanism for the B787 under clause 34.1.8 of EA10 will continue to apply and be extended to the A350.
In addition, a new long-range AFDP of 19.5 hours will apply to the A350/ B787, providing an overtime mechanism for qualifying flying.
For both the A350 and B787, the surge divisor will be removed, effectively reducing maximum divisor by five hours.
Taken together, the reduced planning and surge divisors mean A350 pilots will ultimately be rostered to fewer hours than under EA10 and the April proposal. While modest, this represents an improvement in the fatigue-related settings applying to the fleet.
The remuneration structure also reflects a deliberate decision to place as much value as possible into the underlying hourly rate, rather than making pilots heavily dependent on variable credits linked to particular forms of flying.
The AFAP had previously pursued improved night credits primarily as a fatigue-mitigation mechanism, rather than as a substitute for ordinary salary increases. Night credits were, however, one of the more controversial features of the April proposal.
Using variable credits to generate a significant component of a pay rise can also introduce uncertainty. A pilot’s remuneration becomes more dependent on the particular routes, patterns and pattern density being operated by the fleet. If the network changes, the value of those credits can also change, even where the pilot continues to perform broadly equivalent work.
For that reason and given the strong survey feedback from B787 pilots opposing the delivery of pay rises via night credits, the AFAP ultimately prioritised placing as much value as possible into the underlying hourly rate.
That rate applies regardless of whether a pilot operates during the day or night and regardless of the particular route network being flown. It also forms the permanent base from which future increases compound and the basis for pay when on periods of leave.
The AFAP considers this a more certain and durable remuneration outcome than relying heavily on credits associated with particular types of flying. We have outlined below further modelling on the impact of these changes for pilots to consider as part of the total remuneration outcomes.
Overall pay increases
The proposed agreement will expire on the earlier of four years from commencement or 31 October 2030.
When the period since EA10 expired in April 2024 is included, the agreement covers approximately 6.5 years, depending on the final commencement date.
The principal remuneration increases include:
- 3% from the first full bid period after 1 July 2026, applied to the existing pay scales and back paid;
- 8.1% and restructured pay arrangements, where applicable, from the first full bid period after commencement and no later than the bid period commencing 28 December 2026;
- 3% from 1 July 2027;
- 3% from 1 July 2028;
- 3% from 1 July 2029; and
- 4% from 1 July 2030.
Please note that C scale Second Officers receive the increase on commencement of the first full bid period ranging from 16-25%.
These percentage increases compound over the life of the agreement.
End-state hourly rate comparison
The table attached here compares the end-state hourly rate at July 2030 for each of the highest categories under four scenarios:
- an EA10 rollover of 3% per annum from July 2024;
- the rejected April offer which had an expiry of June 2030;
- the April offer assuming an additional 3% increase in July 2030; and
- the proposed EA11.
It also shows the total cumulative increase in hourly rates over the life of each scenario.
Total Remuneration Outcome
As above, the hourly-rate tables should not be viewed as the sole measure of the pay outcome. Pilots should consider the total remuneration outcome, as part of assessing the package overall. In addition, changes including Blank Line payments and the A350/B787 AFDPs increase actual remuneration beyond the movement visible in the hourly-rate tables.
On the common modelling assumptions of consistent work performed under EA10 to EA11 (further details are below), the total remuneration outcome across the period covered by the agreement is:
- 28.4% - A380 Captain / FO / Legacy SO
- 43.6% - A380 C-Scale SO
- 29.2% - A350 Captain / FO
• 37.6% - A350 SO
- 29.0% - B787 Captain / FO / SO
- 28.8% - A330 Captain / FO / Legacy SO
- 44.0% - A330 C-Scale SO
Modelling assumptions
Because some elements of the agreement depend on the flying actually performed, common assumptions have been used to produce comparable figures across categories. The underpinning assumption is the same work performed under EA10 v EA11 (No vote doc and proposed EA11) to produce an apples with apples comparison to inform pilots decision making.
The modelling assumes:
- one Blank Line per year, attracting 12 hours passive credit;
- six standbys performed during that Blank Line, attracting half an hour passive credit for each standby;
- Blank Line divisor pay valued at five hours; and
- for the A350, two qualifying Sunrise patterns per roster - one London (LHR) and one New York (JFK),
- Leave excluded from AFDP production.
These assumptions allow the variable components of the agreement to be included in the overall remuneration comparison on a consistent basis.
Actual outcomes for individual pilots will vary depending on roster composition, the number of Blank Lines and standbys performed, Blank Line utilisation, standby activity and the amount of qualifying Sunrise flying performed.
Accordingly, the percentages above should be understood as modelled total remuneration outcomes using common assumptions, rather than a guarantee that every pilot will receive precisely the same percentage increase in every year.
B787 Second Officer Pay Outcomes
Under this package, 787 Second Officers receive the same percentage pay increases as Captains and First Officers, rather than the slightly higher increases provided for in the April proposal. A key focus of the renegotiation following the April vote was addressing the significant disparity affecting C Scale pilots, while delivering consistent increases across the other categories. This has resulted in a substantial improvement in remuneration for C Scale pilots compared with April and, over the life of the agreement, effectively closes the gap between C and B Scale.
The consequence of this approach is that the outcome for 787 Second Officers falls short of the April proposal if it is assumed that the April structure would also have received an additional 3% increase in July 2030, an increase that was not actually included in that proposal.
We recognise this aspect of the package will understandably be disappointing for 787 Second Officers. However, EA9 and EA10 created significant disparities between different pilot categories, and in our assessment it is simply not achievable to unwind all of those disparities within a single agreement. This assessment is made on the basis of risk analysis, the likely outcome of a determination and the likely outcome of escalation. The approach taken in EA11 has therefore been to make substantial progress where the greatest disparity remains, while delivering broadly consistent percentage increases across the other categories.
Bringing Second Officers closer together on remuneration is also important beyond this agreement. Reducing the disparities between Legacy, B-Scale and C-Scale Second Officers creates a more unified cohort and provides a stronger platform from which to bargain collectively in EA12.
There are also several important points B787 Second Officers should consider when comparing this package with April.
Firstly, total remuneration for B-Scale B787 Second Officers at the end of the proposed EA11 is higher than what was included in the April proposal, based on the common modelling assumptions set out earlier in this brief. The comparison should therefore not be made solely by looking at one component of the pay structure.
Additionally, much of the April increase was delivered through night credits (10.8% of the uplift on commencement was attributed to night credits). While night credits did offer financial value to B787 pilots, as we have outlined above, our survey results indicated the variable nature of outcomes meant it was not valued as highly as hourly rate.
For B787 Second Officers, the underlying hourly rate increases by 26.53% over the life of the agreement across all year levels, compared with 15.8% under the April offer. Even if a further 3% increase in 2030 is assumed for the April proposal, despite that increase not forming part of the April offer, the corresponding hourly-rate increase would have been approximately 19.25%.
We therefore ask B787 Second Officers to assess this outcome as part of the package as a whole, including:
- the total remuneration outcome over the life of EA11;
- the substantially stronger underlying hourly rate;
- the reduced reliance on variable flying via night credits;
- the progress made in reducing disparities across the Second Officer cohort; and
- the significantly reduced concessions compared with the April proposal.
We recognise that not every element of the renegotiated package will improve equally for every category. However, considered in its entirety, we believe the proposed EA11 represents a stronger and more balanced outcome across the board.
C-Scale Second Officers
Pay increases are uniform across ranks within the A330 and A380, with the important exception of C-Scale Second Officers who receive a substantially larger increase.
This materially reduces the existing disparity between C-Scale and other Second Officer groups. On the common modelling assumptions used in this brief, the total nominal uplift is:
- 43.6% for A380 C-Scale Second Officers; and
- 44.0% for A330 C-Scale Second Officers.
- 37.6% for A350 Second Officers (aligning them with B787 SOs)
The practical effect is to largely eliminate C-Scale as a separate lower-paid remuneration tier and move new-hire Second Officers towards broadly comparable annual remuneration across fleets.
While disparity in hourly rates on the A380 and A330 remain, annual remuneration across the Second Officer group becomes significantly more aligned.
This is an important first step in correcting the legacy of previous agreements that divided the Second Officer group into Legacy, B-Scale and C-Scale categories.
As above, those divisions make collective bargaining more difficult. A more unified remuneration structure gives pilots a stronger platform for future bargaining because improvements can increasingly be pursued for the Second Officer group as a whole.
The end of agreement rate
Importantly, pilots finish this agreement on a higher salary and higher hourly rate than under the rejected April proposal. This is primarily because there is an additional 4% increase in July 2030.
Assuming an extra 3% was added to the April offer in July 2030, the A380, A350, B787 (Captains and FOs) and A330 SOs would still come out higher under the proposed EA11, while A330 (Captains and FOs) and B787 SOs would come out marginally lower.
This comparison matters because the end-of-agreement rate becomes the starting point for the next round of bargaining.
A stronger underlying rate therefore has value well beyond EA11. It provides a higher base for future percentage increases, compounds throughout a pilot’s career and, where applicable, increases associated superannuation contributions.
This was a central objective of the AFAP negotiating team and is one of the reasons the AFAP placed significant emphasis on securing value in the underlying rate rather than relying excessively on variable credits.
Total remuneration at the end of the agreement
The differences between the various proposals become clearer when total remuneration is compared at the end of EA11 using common assumptions for the variable components applying under each scenario.
The table attached here compares the highest pay-rate outcomes at July 2030 and the resulting total remuneration under an EA10 rollover, the rejected April proposal, an illustrative April + 3% scenario, and the proposed EA11.
Assumptions
The July 2030 remuneration comparison above uses a common set of modelling assumptions for each fleet to allow the Rollover, April proposal, April + 3% scenario and proposed EA11 outcomes to be compared on a consistent basis.
Where work-rule settings differ between proposals, the modelling seeks to compare equivalent work outcomes, rather than simply applying the same divisor or AFDP assumptions to every scenario.
These comparisons reinforce an important point: the value of EA11 should not be assessed by isolating a single percentage increase or a single line in a pay table.
The assumptions used are contained in the table attached here.
Platform for future negotiations
Pilots also need to consider where the agreement leaves their underlying rate and their total remuneration at the end of the bargaining period.
Pilots should place value on the 4% in the final year. Pilots will enter bargaining with a 4% (above wages policy) pay rise locked in. While Qantas’ position will be the first EA12 pay rise is July 2031, pilots will begin negotiations without the threat of backpay over their heads for at least 7 months of initial bargaining. During this period pilots will also have rights to take protected industrial action (PIA), given it will be after the nominal expiry date of EA11.
This is the point from which pilots will commence bargaining and cumulative increases into EA12 will apply from. This has a compounding benefit into the next EA.
Remuneration is a central component of EA11, but it is one part of a broader proposed agreement.
The proposal also contains a number of structural and work-rule changes that affect how pilots manage their work and personal lives. Some of these changes are relatively modest in isolation, while others are more significant for particular cohorts or circumstances.
The concessions contained in the current proposal have also changed substantially from those included in the rejected April proposal. An assessment of the overall agreement therefore requires consideration of the remuneration outcomes alongside the work-rule changes, protections and concessions that form part of the package.
We will provide further briefings on other significant elements of the proposed agreement, including Blank Line reform, gains and concessions, trainer package improvements, and the escalation options available if the proposal is not approved.
Our objective through these briefings is to give pilots the information necessary to assess each of these elements, understand the trade-offs involved, and form their own view of the proposed agreement and the alternatives available.
Questions and Feedback
If you have any questions or further feedback, please contact your AFAP Qantas Pilot Council representatives at qpc@afap.org.au, or the AFAP Legal and Industrial team:
Executive Director Simon Lutton – simon@afap.org.au
Senior Legal/Industrial Officer Patrick Larkins – patrick@afap.org.au
Senior Legal/Industrial Officer Deanna Cain – deanna@afap.org.au
Regards,
AFAP Qantas Pilot Council
Michael Egan – Chair
Mark Gilmour – Vice-Chair
Rob Close – Secretary
Michael Armessen – Committee Member
David LaPorte – Committee Member
Josh Chalmers – Committee Member
Rob Gilmour – Committee Member