AFAP Qantas Pilot Council Briefing No. 7
Happy New Year everyone!
Welcome to all of the new members that have signed up over the last few weeks. It’s been great to see so many existing AFAP members carry their memberships across to mainline as they start the next chapter of their careers, and it’s very encouraging to see so many new AFAP members sign up from mainline in the last few weeks.
Feedback about our “matter-of-fact approach” has been very positive but, as we have mentioned time and again, we welcome any suggestions, ideas and involvement in general from members. It’s important to remember that the QPC is an unpaid volunteer group of members, elected by members, solely to represent members.
SH EA
As advised in December, and following our letter to the company outlining what the AFAP viewed as a breach of good faith bargaining, details of the company’s initial proposed offer were eventually released to the pilots. The proposed offer appears to be an attempt at anchoring, with conditions considerably far away from what would be acceptable enough for the QPC supporting a vote on. We hope to meet with the company again soon to discuss our log of claims derived from the SH EA survey results.
LH EA
As we approach negotiations for the next LH EA, we are working on our LH EA survey. The LH EA survey results will drive our log of claims. It’s important that these surveys are free from bias, and it is equally important that we cover all of the significant matters faced by members. We welcome your input and involvement in this process.
EA Historical Context
The large number of new mainline pilots that have joined the AFAP recently (or remained members from their previous employment) has served as a timely reminder that having some knowledge of previous negotiations and their final outcomes is paramount in educated decision making. As such, over the two weekly briefs, we will give a brief description of some of the wins and losses in the last two LH EAs. This is by no means a comprehensive list, rather, some important items to keep in mind in the lead up to negotiations. It is also not a criticism of previous bargaining, but highlights how aggressive the Company’s tactics have been in past negotiations.
The list below reiterates a need for pilots to:
- stop trading conditions for perceived “wins”; and
- review all offers from the Company critically and with a healthy dose of scepticism.
EA9 2015 - Part 1 of 2
EA9 introduced the 787 under the LH EA, but in a starkly different structure than the previous introductions of new equipment (e.g., A330, A380). As is common knowledge, the higher hourly rate on the 787 was achieved, but with the loss of AFDP (“overtime”) and 4 pilot night credits and a reduced 2-3 pilot night credit (25% versus 33% previously).
Initially, this appeared to be a win for the pilots. Increasing the hourly rate meant that should the 787 do shorter range flying (e.g., Asia), pilots would be better off. However, reality shows that the majority of 787 flying has been ultra long range, where the higher hourly rate has not compensated for the loss of overtime. A good comparison at present is the A330 doing BNE-LAX. On a like-for-like comparison, an A330 FO makes approximately $50,000 more per year than their 787 colleague, and the 787 pilot has to go to work more often for the same divisor. This translates in general terms to more work for less remuneration.
Pilots on leave also stood to benefit from the higher hourly rate. This win, however, should be seen in the context of what was traded to achieve this (see further below). It is important that all implications of the next negotiation are considered including perceived ‘wins’ for the pilot body, as well as the unintended consequences much further down the line, including for those who have yet to start their Qantas careers.
Night credits removed for 787 4 pilot; reduced for 2/3 pilots
The loss of night credits had the effect of requiring 787 pilots spending more time at work and having less recovery time at home than pilots flying the same routes would have under EA8.
For those new to the company, night credits are an increase (or loading) of 33% in trip credit for the hours flown at night. This “health credit” acknowledged the fatiguing nature of back of the clock operations. Special rules for working at night are not unusual across a wide range of industries.
Formerly, a pilot undertaking more flying at night would achieve exactly the same pay as a daytime-flying colleague, but in reality, operated for less hours in the seat as the night hours attracted 33% more credit (i.e., less time at work to achieve divisor). The removal of these health credits failed to address the increased fatigue created by flying at night/back of the clock. Particularly given the ultra-long-haul nature of today’s Qantas network. It is important to remember night credits are not a direct pay function, rather a way of achieving a given pay for less work.
Overtime loss 787
Overtime (i.e., 1 extra hour for duties over 12 hours, and an extra 0.5 hours for duties over 14 hours) was traded away for the increased hourly rate on the 787 (amongst other things). Given the 787 flies predominantly long- and ultra-long-routes that would have attracted overtime under EA8, the change has proven to be a net loss when compared to EA8. A pilot flying an average 787 roster, on similar routes on EA8 conditions would have been better off financially, with more time off. Again, refer to the real life LAX comparison with the A330 above.
Further, despite promises at the time, the 787 has served as a replacement mostly for previous 747 flying (indeed, many of the same routes: JNB, SCL, LAX, JFK, DFW).
Many pilots were RIN’d (Reduction In Numbers) off the 747 onto the 787, so comparisons can easily be made in terms of take-home differences. Total income for the same flying was dramatically reduced on the replacement aircraft, a tangible change for those affected.
It should be noted that prior to voting, the information provided to pilots generally inferred that the 787s would not be a replacement aircraft, but would provide additional flying. It also showed very little ULR flying. Unfortunately, this appears to have been a misrepresentation, as we see that almost all the previous 747 flying is now performed by the 787.
S/O B Scale 787 operations
EA9 also saw the S/O hourly rate reduced from 50% of a Captain's hourly rate to 35% of a Captain’s hourly rate. Understandably, this is perceived by some to be the first Qantas “B” scale. You can compare the rates for yourself on pages 97 and 98 of the LH EA. It is important to note here the comparison to the many scales that the Flight Attendants have across their various contracts. Obviously, as a united pilot body this should be avoided at all costs.
In next week’s update, Part 2 will follow where we include a summation of EA10 and we will use Qantas’ own documents to show just how few aircraft have actually arrived, despite the usual promises inferring that voting yes will equate to dramatic growth.
For any general inquiries regarding this update or other matters at Qantas please contact the AFAP legal and industrial team of Senior Legal/ Industrial Officer Pat Larkins (patrick@afap.org.au), Senior Industrial Officer Chris Aikens (chris@afap.org.au), or Executive Director Simon Lutton (simon@afap.org.au).
Regards,
AFAP Qantas Pilot Council
Michael Egan - Chair
Mark Gilmour - Vice- Chair
Daniel Kobeleff - Secretary
Michael Armessen - Committee Member